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BOOK REVIEW 
THE WORD ON TRIAL 
THE WORD AND THE LAw, by Milner S. Ball,* Uruversity of 
CIncago Press, 1993. Pp. 216. $29.50 
ROBIN WEST** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Milner Ball's extraordinary book, The Word and the Law/ 
begInS with a narratIve account of "seven practIces In law ,,2 The 
seven practitIoners Ball bnngs to life for the reader share two 
powerful traits: they all, In quite different ways, use law to less-
en the multIple suffenngs ofvanous communitIes of poor people, 
and they all, by dOIng so, strengthen the communitIes witInn 
wInch and for wInch they labor. One IS a landlord-tenant city 
Judge, who both cares about the needs and protects the nghts of 
poor tenants.3 Another IS a tribal Judge, who Immerses Inmself 
In the lives of the resIdents of the reservatIon over wInch he 
presIdes In order to dispense an orgaruc and communal, as well 
as orderly and moral, JustIce.4 A tlnrd IS a law student, who 
prepares herself to advocate for the homeless by shanng theIr 
lodgIng In the New Haven Amtrak Rail StatIon.5 A fourth, her 
colleague and teacher, IS a dedicated Yale clirucIan who tIreless-
ly devotes Inmself to the needs of sometImes desperate clients 
and the less desperate but nonetheless preSSIng concerns and 
Interests of law students.6 Another IS an ACLU lawyer and ac-
* Caldwell Professor of Constitutiollal Law, Uruversity of GeorgIa. 
** Professor of Law, Georgetown Uruversity Law Center. 
1. MILNER S. BALL, THE WORD AND THE LAw (1993). 
2. See m. at 7-72. 
3. Id. at 24-38. 
4. Id. at 38-49. 
5. Id. at 60-72. 
6. Id. 
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tIVISt, a larger-than-life veteran of the Freedom Rides and antI-
war movements, who, dnven by a life long paSSIon for JustIce, 
agItates agamst thIs socIety's tolerance, even embrace, of the 
death penalty 7 Another IS a legal serVIces lawy;er m eastern 
Kentucky, deeply mvolved m the lives, illnesses and struggles of 
the coal mmers for whom he labors,s and the last IS the head of 
the Indian Law Resource Center, committed to retaImng or 
reclaImmg the land-not Just nghtful compensatIOn-on whIch 
displaced tribes can reestablish theIr socIety 9 Ball's descnptIons 
of these legal practIces are effectIve, and affectIng. These peo-
ple-two Judges, a student, a teacher, an advocate for the nghts 
of NatIve Amencans, an actIVIst on behalf of a cause, and a 
poverty lawyer-do come to life, and VIVIdly so. These stones 
work. The reader gets a good sense of the humor, the sadness, 
the motIvatIOns, the daily toils, and the emotIonal color of the 
lives of these seven practitIoners. 
The stones work m another sense as well. The reader gaIns 
from these accounts not only a sympathetIc understanding of the 
lives of seven lawyers, but a renewed sense of the possibilitles 
theIr practIces present. ThIs can be put any number of ways. 
Perhaps most sImply, Ball's retelling of these practIces opens the 
possibility of finding m "legal practIce" a vehIcle for helpmg 
people, for attending with care to the needs of people, for mak-
mg a change m the world for the better, for actmg with compas-
SIon toward the end of socIal JustIce. These practIces deserve our 
admIratIOn, but they are by no means beyond our grasp. They 
are human-sIzed practIces that suggest the feasibility, and not 
Just the nobility, of a profeSSIOnal life committed to socIal JustIce. 
Put differently, these practIces open the possibility for finding 
spIritual satIsfactIOn m legal work: for "sleepmg well at mght" 
as one Judge puts It,10 for resolVIng what the Tikkun recently 
has called "the cnSIS of meanmg" m our contemporary lives, 11 
for discovenng the JOY that comes from losmg oneself m the 
7. Id. at 7-16. 
8. Id. at 16-24. 
9. Id. at 49-60. 
10. Id. at 37. 
11. Michael Lerner, Memo to Clinton: Our First Hundred Days, TIKKUN, Jan.-Feb. 
1993, at 8, 8. 
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seI'Vlce of somethIng greater. These lawyers serve the poor and 
will not, do not, and have not made money from theIr practIce of 
law, but they are demonstrably happIer with themselves, theIr 
pasts, and theIr world, than theIr more finanCIally successful 
brethren. Not many students come to law school with the pro-
fessed desIre to achIeve spIritual satIsfactIon. But these stones, 
and the practIces they describe, are Important eVIdence that 
those who do enter law with that ambitIon can surely succeed In 
fulfilling it. 
Another way to describe the "possibility" opened by these 
practIces, and one that may be closer to the core of Ball's con-
cerns, IS that these practIces open the possibility of "enlivemng" 
the dead letter of law· of puttIng the Ghost back In the machIne, 
of InvestIng law with the possibility of transcendence, of finding 
In the nailed-shut crossed-t's and dotted-i's finality of the legal 
text the possibility of multIple meamng, nuance, and subtlety, 
and hence the unspoken prOmIse of a better, other world. To use 
Ball's language, we mIght find In these legal practwes what we 
rarely find In the legal statute, commercIal contract or JudiCIal 
opImon: some eVIdence of our trust In the "presence of God," or 
some eVIdence of h~s trust In our creatIvity, rather than eVIdence 
of our wager on hIs absence, as we expect to find In the legal 
documents we read and often Intend to plant In the legal docu-
ments we draft.12 These practIces open the possibility, In other 
words, of a spIritual awakemng of law itself. They remInd us, to 
quote one of the subJects, of that "shImng moment" when the 
"system" was actually attentIve to the VOIces and needs of the 
poor.13 They underscore the SImple truth that it IS an ever-pres-
ent possibility that it mIght become so agaIn. 
Put yet another way, these practIces open the possibility of 
USIng the law, whIch so often oppresses, as a vehIcle for libera-
tIOn: of finding, agamst all odds, In the ambIguitIes of the Con-
stitutIon the message of deliverance for NatIve Amencan tribes, 
rather than the expreSSIon of mendacity and a policy of reckless 
12. Tins IS the concern of Chapter Six, entitled Morbldity and Viability m Law. 
See espeCIally BALL, supra note 1, at 136-42. 
13. Id. at 38 (refernng to the Warren Court). 
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annihilatIOn;14 of finding m the fine pnnt of the Housmg Code 
the message of protectIOn agrunst the elements rather than the 
free alienability of land and shelter;15 of finding m the complex-
itIes of the Federal Coal Mine, Health and Safety Act the prom-
Ise of compensatIOn for mJury rather than the bleak prospect of 
"uphill lawyenng" withm the shadow of a four-out-of-a-hundred 
success rate;16 of finding m the eloquent language of the Cruel 
and Unusual Purushment Clause of the Eighth Amendment of 
the ConstitutIOn a means of redeemmg the world through JUS-
tIce, and nothmg more and nothlng less-certrunly not a "sacred 
text" possessmg its own mtnnsIC value but also not an empty 
promIse legItImatmg an unJust status quo;17 of finding m the 
SImple communal folkways of a people a roadmap for a Just rule 
of law rather than the end product of centunes of confinement 
and oppressIOn;18 or of finding m the eyes of the Amtrak secun-
ty guards the possibility for human empathy and warmth rather 
than the thlrst for order and the threat of eVICtIOn.19 All of 
these lawyers see m law, legal mstitutIOns, documents, and 
laws' enforcers the possibility that they mIght be used toward 
the end of liberatmg the human spInt and nurtunng and sus-
tammg the body Through theIr practIce, they make those POSSI-
bilitIes ever the slightly more real. 
Finally, these practIces open the possibility of redeemmg, m a 
sense, CIvilizatIon Itself. In vanous ways they realize the POSSI-
bility of usmg words, rules, laws, and clear linguIstIC structures, 
coupled WIth force and the organIzed power of the state, m order 
to create, strengthen, sustam, or unify, rather than destroy, 
flatten, alienate, or oppress, a beloved people, or a blessed com-
munity The practIces Ball describes open the possibility of em-
ploymg law toward the end of life rather than death, and, more 
speCIfically, of puttmg law to the servlce of the supplicatIOns of 
the weak rather than the exploitatIve tendencIes of the 
14. [d. at 49-60 (the story of Tim Coulter, actiVIst Native AmerIcan lawyer). 
15. [d. at 24-38 (the story of Margaret Taylor, committed housmg court Judge). 
16. [d. at 16-24 (the story of John Rosenberg, who represents coal mmers). 
17. [d. at 7-16 (the story of Civil Rights crusader Henry Schwarzschild). 
18. [d. at 38-49 (the story of tribal Judge DaVId Harding). 
19. [d. at 60-72 (the story of Steve Wizner and Carla Ingersoll, tireless advocates 
for the homeless). 
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strong.20 They open the possibility of employmg law toward the 
end of truth rather than power. They open the possibility of 
moral politIcs. 
These stones ''work'' In a tInrd sense as well. The practIces 
Ball describes do more than remInd us of the possibilitIes sug-
gested above; they do more than InSpIre some of us to emulate 
these practIces. They also serve, and I tInnk are Intended to 
serve, as an effectIve reJoInder to a very specific and heretofore 
unanswered critIque of law and "good lawyenng" that has 
emerged from the law and literature movement, to wit, Richard 
WeIsberg's Indictment of "the Word"-legalism and ChrIstendom 
both-m Ins remarkable book The Failure of the Word.21 
WeIsberg's critIque IS quite different from the more familiar 
critIques of legalism that have been urged by the CritIcal Legal 
Studies movement and related critIcal movements In legal aca-
demIa.22 Because WeIsberg's critIque IS itself an Important one, 
and because Ball's stones at least to some degree are responSIve 
to it (and apparently Intended to be so), both the critIque and 
the way In wInch Ball's seven legal practIces mIght be construed 
as its rebuttal are worth spelling out In some detail. 
In Failure of the Word, through a close reading of a handful of 
literary texts Involvmg lawyer-protagorusts, and most notably 
through an unconventIonal but largely convmcmg InterpretatIOn 
of the motIves of CaptaIn Vere In Herman Melville's claSSIC 
novella Billy Budd, Sailor/3 WeIsberg argued that the appar-
ently "good" ChrIstIan lawyer, through the marupulatIOn of 
words, "the Word," laws, and the Rule of Law IS often, perhaps 
usually, servICmg Ins own pnvate, "subJectIve," and perverse 
ends, themselves fueled by an attitude of resentment, and a 
tInrst for personal revenge.24 WeIsberg's work suggests that the 
lawyerly or JudiCIal quest for JustIce through the "verbalizmg" 
20. Id. at 135, 146-64. 
21. RICHARD H. WEISBERG, THE FAILURE OF THE WORD: THE PROTAGONIST AS 
LAWYER IN MODERN FICTION (1984). 
22. See, e.g., DaVId Karrys, Introduction to THE POLITICS OF LAW 1 (DavId Karrys 
ed., 1990) (exammmg the Critical Legal Studies movement). 
23. HERMAN MELVILLE, BILLY BUDD, SAILOR (Hamson Hayford & Merton M. 
Sealts, Jr. eds., 1962). 
24. WEISBERG, supra note 21, at 131-76. 
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forms of law, masks, at least on occaSIOn and perhaps typIcally, 
an Ignoble and perverse quest by the "artIculate classes" for 
revenge agamst the hated and feared purity of feeling and supe-
nor physIcal and moral strength of the natural and nonverbal 
human ammaP5 The lawyer, WeIsberg argued, even (perhaps 
especIally) the "good lawyer," may be motIvated not by a desIre 
to effectuate a Just order m an unjust world, but rather, by a 
repugnance or revulsIOn, fueled by Jealousy, fear and resent-
ment, agamst the natural, and partIcularly the pre-verbal, man 
of mstmct, emotIOn, and physIcal strength.26 The "good" done 
by the good lawyer with both law and ChrIstIanity IS hopelessly 
entangled with trus twIsted urge to use those forms to best the 
man of natural strength with the artIfiCIal forms of CIviliza-
tIon-ChrIstIan love and legalistIc form. 
The moral peril that WeIsberg's critIque umquely rughlights IS 
not the familiar danger to wruch the CritIcal Legal Studies 
movement attends27• that law ~tself, although apparently Just, 
masks or legitImates mJustIce. Rather, WeIsberg focuses on the 
more subtle danger that regardless of the mJustIce or JustIce of 
the substantIve legal regIme, the personality of the mdiVIduals 
who must be relied upon to realize a legal order IS an untrust-
worthy one. The most Ideal legal regIme can be put to the fur-
therance of the perverted ends of the resentful and vengeful 
lawyer or Judge.28 The use of ChrIstIamty to effectuate a VICtOry 
over the pagan religIons, like the use and mlsuse of legalism to 
effectuate VIctones over the Nietzchean natural man, should be 
understood as a part of trus rustoncal struggle. Although per-
haps not meVItable, the possibility of perversIOn fueled by 
ressentIment IS ever-present. 
Ball tells us m rus acknowledgements that at least rus title IS 
mspIred m part by WeIsberg's thesIs.29 If Ball mtended rus own 
book to serve as a reJomder to WeIsberg's critIque, the stones 
are well chosen. The practIces portrayed m The Word and the 
25. See ld., see also ld. at 1-9. 
26. Id. at 131-76. 
27. See, e.g., KalryS, supra note 22, at 1-9. 
28. ConSIder, In thIS regard, Jean Baptiste Clamence, the protagorust In ALBERT 
CAMUS, THE FALL (1956). 
29. BALL, supra note 1, at 166. 
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Law mdeed are effectIve responses to WeIsberg's Nietzchean 
polaritIes. These lawyers are not perverse. They seek neither 
personal wealth nor power. They do not suffer from dark, hId-
den, comprOmIsmg motIves; theIr actIons do not constitute the 
outward manifestatIon of a secret contempt for men of actIon, of 
blood, of the flesh. They are not twIsted mtellects, seekIng re-
venge agaInst the directness of nature. They are not real-life 
CaptaIn Veres, usmg the forms of law and the rituals of 
ChrIstIanity to diSguIse SICk subjectIve ends. These lawyers' ends 
are sImple, and even natural. They are "of the flesh." 
But nor are Ball's lawyers creatures of ammalistIc will. TheIr 
actIons are not the honest, pre- or non-verbal, direct acts of the 
SImple-mInded, childlike, mnocent, natural man. Just as the 
reader will find no CaptaIn Veres m these stones, she will not 
find any Billy Budds. As Ball repeatedly emphasIzes, these law-
yers are professIOnals who are good at what they do and enJoy 
domg it,a° and what they do IS use the forces of law, the sanc-
tIOn of the State, and the rules of CIvility and CIvilizatIon, m 
order to achIeve ends dictated by compaSSIOn, kIndness and 
fellow feeling. To use WeIsberg's language, theIr practIces are 
verbal and powerful. 31 Indeed, they are usmg the linguIstIc 
structures of law to coerce results that could not be achIeved 
through the powers bestowed upon them by nature. But theIr 
motIvatIon does not denve from a resentment, fear, or Jealousy 
of the natural realm. TheIr practIces are not responses to a 
twIsted and narCIssIstIc need to quell natural forces toward one's 
own subjectIve end, but rather, borrOWIng Ball's language, they 
are responses to the Word; they exemplify the success, so to 
speak, rather than the failure, of the Word. In a secular context, 
the practIces are aImed at creatIng community by alleVIatIng the 
suffenng of others and not at Imposmg a perverse subjectIve 
agenda on an unsuspectIng world through the apparently mno-
cent forms of law and ChrIstIan feeling. TheIr motIves are 
nonduplicitous, theIr goals are SImple, and theIr methods are the 
methods of law-rules, distInctIons, arguments, wordiness, CIvili-
30. Id. at 156-58. 
31. WEISBERG, supra note 21, at 1-7, 177-79. 
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ty 32 In other words, these lawyers represent the possibility 
that WeIsberg's study demes eXIsts. 
Had Ball ended hIs book with hIs accounts of these lawyers' 
practIces, he would have produced a remarkable and Important 
book. The descnptIOns of theIr practIces alone, with almost no 
needed commentary, bnng to life moral ways of liVIng m law 
that are worthy of emulatIOn, admIratIon, and consIderatIOn. 
Ball's accountmg of them bnngs to life a subJectIVIty that seem-
mgly IS the antithesIs of the "res sentIment" WeIsberg finds so 
prevalent m Western and ChnstIan legal thought and practIce. 
But of course, Ball's book does not end sImply with these 
descnptIOns. The second half of the book contams what nught be 
charactenzed best as a sequence of meditatIons on some of the 
possibilitIes opened up by the lawyers' stones. Most Importantly, 
Ball explores the possibility that the distmguIshIng feature of 
these practIces IS that they are liVIng responses to God's Word. 
As such, Ball ultImately concludes that, unsurpnsmgly, they 
share the traits noted above: that all of these practitIOners ser-
VIce the poor and build community 33 Ball wants ultImately to 
leave us WIth the possibility that theology can be brought to 
bear on the attempt to understand these practIces, and that by 
domg so, we can discern a relatIOn between God's Word and the 
legal work of these seven mdiVIduals. The workIngs of God's 
Word can be found m these practIces. 
These meditatIOns reSIst sImple summary or recapItulatIon. 
No clear line of argument ultImately builds toward the conclu-
SIOn noted above; the book IS avowedly "expenmental" and non-
linear.34 Ball employs not only theologIcal argument, but also 
literary mterpretatIOn, JournalistIc reportIng, a good deal of 
personal narratIve, and sImply, moral reflectIOn to engage the 
reader directly WIth both the seven practIces and with the texts, 
biblical, literary, and legal, that he bnngs to the task of under-
standing. These meditatIOns are overflOWIng with mSIght, sug-
gestIOn, descnptIOn, self-revelatIOn, mterpretatIOn, and stones 
withIn stones wIthm stones. While never sentImental, hIs medi-
32. Id. at 158-64. 
33. Id. at 150-55. 
34. Id. at 1, 73. 
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tatIOns are truly hearterung. They tell the story of one man's 
Intellectual attempt to make moral and religIous sense of hIs 
own life, and the lives of some people he admIres, In law It IS a 
story, and an Intellectual Journey, that IS well conceIved and 
well told. 
In the remaInder of thIs ReVIew, I will comment very bnefly 
on two of the theologIcal themes that recur In Ball's meditatIons 
and note what I thInk are some possible connectIOns between hIs 
theologIcal arguments and some of our legal practIces and habits 
of mInd. Thus, In Part II below, I will explore the possibility 
that the discussIOn Ball proVIdes of the use of parables In the 
Bible, and partIcularly hIs challengIng InterpretatIOn of a pas-
sage from the Book of Mark regarding the use of parables, mIght 
also shed some light on the use of narratIve by critIcal race theo-
nsts, as well as some of the recent critIcIsm that narratIve Juns-
prudence has elicited. In Part III, I bnefly suggest that the rela-
tIon for whIch Ball argues between relii:;1.on and Belief, or be-
tween religIOUS practIces and God's Word, may find an echo In 
the relatIon between law and JustIce. I hope that by draWIng 
analOgIes between the theologIcal arguments Ball makes about 
religIon and the Word, on the one hand, and some of our con-
temporary debates about law and JustIce, on the other, I am not 
tnVIalizIllg or grossly mIsstatIng Ball's positIOns. I must empha-
SIze that the analOgIes I draw are mIne, not hIs, and I apolOgIze 
for any distortIon III hIs positIOns that may result from my at-
tempt to make a coherent claIm that fruitful analOgIes eXIst. 
II. NARRATIVlTY, PARABLE, AND THE LIMITS OF UNDERSTANDING 
The most techrucal, one of the lengthIest, perhaps the most 
mystenous, and I thInk the pIvotal chapter of thIs book, entitled 
Mark, Isawh, and the Empty Place, puts forward an Interpreta-
tIon of Mark 4:10-12.35 In that passage, Mark tells us that Je-
sus, to the frustratIon and bewilderment of hIs Immediate lis-
teners and future generatIons of biblical scholars, explaIned to 
hIs diSCIples that the reason he couches hIs teachIngs In para-
bles IS not to promote understanding, as one mIght thInk, but 
35. Id. at 106-28. 
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very much to the contrary The reason he uses parables IS to 
prevent understanding: 
And when he was alone, those who were about hun with 
the twelve asked concermng the parables. And he srud to 
them, ''To you has been gIven the secret of the kIngdom of 
God, but for the others everythIng IS m parables; m order 
that they may 'indeed see but not perceIve, and may mdeed 
hear but not understand; lest they should turn agrun, and be 
discharged. ,,36 
ThIs IS, as Ball tells the reader several tImes, a very difficult 
passage.37 Why would Jesus do such a sadistIc thIng? Why 
would he say such a perverse thmg? What does it mean to teach 
If the pomt of the teachmg IS to block understanding? Ball's 
brave mterpretatIOn of thIs difficult passage alone IS worth the 
pnce of the book. First, Ball argues, m a largely techmcal argu-
ment well beyond the scope of thIs diSCUSSIOn, that a close read-
mg of the relevant texts cannot sustaIn the much more bemgn 
renditIOn of Jesus' words offered by Matthew m Matthew 13:13-
15.38 Matthew's Jesus reports that he speaks m parables be-
cause the people cannot explaIn hIs message, not m order to 
msure that they fail to understand.39 ThIs reading, Ball argues, 
while certamly a more comfortmg one, does not withstand scru-
tmy 40 
Of more Immediate mterest to the general readershIp of thIs 
book, however, Ball also argues agaInst a powerful reading of 
thIs passage put forward by Frank Kermode m hIs Justly ac-
claImed book, The Genes~s of Secrecy 41 Kermode uses the pas-
sage from Mark to argue, m effect, for the necessary and Irre-
ducible opaqueness of narratIve texts.42 The passage, Kermode 
argues, like Kafka's famous parable "Before the Law,,,43 IS eVI-
dence of the peculiar way m whIch narratIves, by VIrtue of theIr 
36. Id. at 106-07 (quoting Mark 4:10-12). 
37. Id. at 106, 111. 
38. Id. at 107-19. 
39. Id. at 107. 
40. Id. at 109. 
41. FRANK KERMODE, THE GENESIS OF SECRECY (1979). 
42. Id. at 33-34. 
43. FRANZ KAFKA, PARABLES AND PARADOXES 60-79 (1972). 
HeinOnline -- 35 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1111 1993-1994
1994] THE WORD ON TRIAL 1111 
openness, both mvite and defy mterpretatlOn.44 Because narra-
tIve texts are "open," they reqUIre mterpretatlOn, but because of 
that same openness, they defy authoritatIve mterpretatlOn: they 
cannot be reduced to, or translated mto, a senes of argumenta-
tIve propositIons. Narratlvity "reqUIres and frustrates mterpre-
tatlOn; It makes mterpretatlOn necessary and VIrtually 
Impossib1e."45 Ball quotes Kermode's conclusIOn: '~Hot for se-
crets, our only conversatIOn may be with guardians who know 
less and see less than we can; and our sole hope and pleasure IS 
m the perceptIOn of a momentary radiance, before the door of 
disappomtment IS finally shut on US.,,46 
Ball puts forward a quite different account. Ball reads thIs 
passage as Mark's direct testImony, m effect, to the power of 
God's Word.47 Mark's accountIng of Jesus' profoundly opaque 
remarks about the opaqueness of parables, Ball argues, m effect 
prefigures the account Mark gIves at the end of the Book of the 
"empty tomb" found by Mary Magdalene, Mary the mother of 
James, and Salome, who were expectIng to find the body of 
Chnst: 
And when the sabbath was past, Mary Magdalene, and 
Mary the mother of James, and Salome, brought spIces, so 
that they nught go and anomt hIm. And very early on the 
first day of the week they went to the tomb when the sun 
had nsen. And they were saymg to one another, ''Who will 
roll away the stone for us from the door of the tomb?" And 
lookmg up, they saw that the stone was rolled back, for it 
was very large. And entermg the tomb, they saw a young 
man sittmg on the nght sIde, dressed m a white robe; and 
they were amazed. And he srud to them, ''Do not be amazed; 
you seek Jesus of Nazareth, who was crucified. He has nsen, 
he IS not here; see the place where they lrud hIm. But go, tell 
hIs diSCIples and Peter that he IS gomg before you to Galilee; 
there you will see hIm, as he told you." And they went out 
and fled from the tomb; for trembling and astorushment had 
44. KERMODE, supra note 41, at 33. 
45. BALL, supra note I, at 107 (summanzmg Kermode's position). 
46. Id. (quoting KERMODE, supra note 41, at 144-45). 
47. BALL, supra note I, at 108, 128, 129-30. 
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come upon them; and they saId nothIng to anyone, for they 
were afraId.48 
The connectIOn between these two passages, Ball argues, IS 
that Mark's account of the "empty tomb" at the end of the Book, 
like the empty tomb ~tsel{, and Mark's account of Jesus' explana-
tIon of the use of parables, like the parables themselves, all cre-
ate an "empty space," or an "irruptIon" In settled understandings 
and expectatIons, In whIch God's Word either will or will not be 
revealed.49 The parables, like the koan-like account Jesus pro-
VIdes of theIr opaqueness, "create a space," Ball goes on to ar-
gue, Into whIch the reader cannot or should not thrust hImself, 
whether through an act of InterpretatIOn, of despaIr, or of the 
will.50 The passage eVIdences not the necessIty and ImpOSSI-
bility of InterpretatIon of narratIve, as Kermode contends, but 
the absolute asymmetrIcal PrIority of God to the believer, of the 
diVIne to the natural, of the Word to the powers of understand-
Ing. It IS not, so to speak, left to us to "find God" by workmg 
through the parables, or even to "find ourselves" by clOSIng the 
narratIve text with our "own" InterpretatIOn. Rather, the 
opaqueness of Jesus' account of the parables, and the opaque-
ness of the parables themselves, and perhaps by extensIOn the 
opaqueness of narratIVIty, proVIdes a different sort of InvitatIon 
altogether: It InVItes humility by causmg an "irruptIon" In our 
understandings, mcluding our understanding of our Intellectual 
or InterpretIve powers.51 WithIn the space created by that Ir-
ruptIOn, Ball suggests, the Word of God may, or may not, be 
revealed. 52 
At the sIzeable rIsk of sounding outrageous, I'd like to suggest 
that Ball's understanding of thIs passage, as well as the under-
standing of the nature of narratIve that it suggests, mIght cast 
needed light on the IncreaSIng, and IncreasIngly controversIal, 
use of narratIVIty and parable by critIcal race theOrIsts, and to a 
lesser extent by some femInIst legal theOrIsts. In the last couple 
48. Id. at 125 (quoting Mark 16:1-8). 
49. Id. at 125-27. 
50. Id. at 125. 
51. Id. at 124-35. 
52. Id. at 127. 
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of years, the use of narratIve by these "outsIder" JUTIsprudes has 
come under a consIderable amount of critIcal attack.53 In es-
sence, the questIons posed by the critIcs of the "narratIve schol-
ars" are the same questIOns posed to Jesus by hIs discIples: Why 
use narratIves? Why speak In parables? Why not sImply make 
the argument, explaIn the POInt? What, if anythIng, does nar-
ratIve add to a legal argument that could not be effected far 
more cleanly and less ambIguously with straIghtforward analytIc 
claIms? 
There IS, of course, a conventIOnal explanatIon for the use of 
narratIve In critIcal race and femImst JUTIsprudence. As I and 
others have argued, the POInt of USIng narratIvity In thIs 
scholarshIp may be to brIng to the fore arguments and under-
standings that for some reason can not be grasped or artIculated 
In more conventIonal ways.54 For example, narratIvity may be 
an Important method for femImsts because of the peculiar "pn-
vateness" of so many of the InJUTIes women sustaIn. The nature 
of these InJunes must be commumcated before theIr InJustIce 
can be made manifest, and narratIve IS VIrtually the only POSSI-
ble way thIs commumcatIon mIght take place. Similarly, 
narratIvity may be an Important method for critIcal race theo-
nsts because of the "frequency," as well as the unfamiliarity, 
and hence the life-aItenng consequences and profundity, of so 
many of the InJUTIes Inflicted by pnvate raCIsm. NarratIvity may 
be the only-hence the best-way to commumcate the felt reali-
ty of beIng an AfrIcan Amencan In thIs culture, subJect to the 
53. See Suzanna Sherry & Damel A. Farber, Telling Stones Out of School: An 
Essay on Legal Narratiues, 45 STAN. L. REv. 807 (1993) (critiCIZIng some femlDlsts 
and critical race theonsts for de-emphasIzIng methods of conventional analYSIS and 
overemphasIZIng sometimes atypIcal or Inaccurate stones that have emotional ap-
peal); Mark Tushnet, The Degradation of Constitutional Discourse, 81 GEO. L.J. 251 
(1992) (CritiCIZIng race theonsts' use of narrative Junsprudence). 
54. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositiomsts and Others: A Plea 
for Narratiue, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2411, 2440 (1989) ("Stones are useful tools for the 
underdog All movements for change must gam the support, or at least the 
understanding, of the dOmInant group."); Man Matsuda, Public Response to RaclSt 
Speech: Consldermg the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2320 (1989) (urgIng legal 
sanctions for raCIst speech by fOCUSIng on stones of the effects of raCIst hate mes-
sages); RobIn West, EconomIc Man and Literary Woman: One Contrast, 39 MERCER 
L. REV. 867 (1988) (concluding that literary legal analysIs helps people to under-
stand and sympathIze with others). 
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multIple mJunes of pnvate, mstitutIOnal, and unconSCIOUS rac-
Ism. When employed for either reason, or for reasons closely 
aligned, critIcal narratIvity IS then servmg utterly traditIonal 
JUTIsprudentIal ends, albeit through an unconventIonal method, 
and it should be Judged and cntICIzed by reference to how well 
or poorly it serves those ends.55 
Whether or not thIs "conventIOnal" accountIng of the dispro-
portIOnate use of narratIVIty m critIcal race and femIlllst legal 
studies-to wit, that cntIcal scholars use narratIve when con-
ventIonal forms of argument are for some reason madequate to 
the entIrely conventIonal end of explammg the nature of an 
mJury, and then advocatmg a partIcular legal reform for its re-
dress-accurately captures the motIves of narratIve scholars, for 
vanous reasons, it has not satIsfied the critIcs of narratIve JUTIS-
prudence. According to theIr mamstream critIcs, the narratIve 
scholars, or at least many of them, SImply have not met the 
burden of shOWIng that the use of narratIve IS either necessary 
or suffiCIent to meet the shared ends of legal discourse.56 I do 
not WIsh to comment here on the merits of that debate. What I'd 
like to suggest more SImply IS that Ball's diSCUSSIOn of the text 
from Mark Implies, albeIt mdirectly, that the premIse of thIs 
debate mIght be mIsguIded: both the defenders and the critIcs 
may be wrong to assume that thIs "conventIonal" account IS the 
best or only account one mIght prOVIde for the use of narratIve 
by outsIder legal scholars. 
Of course, one mIght expect Jesus to have made preCIsely thIs 
"conventIonal" account of narratIve when asked to explam hIs 
reliance on parable. Sensibly we mIght have expected Jesus to 
explam that parable IS used where conventIOnal explanatIon 
fails. Partly because of the weIght of that expectatIOn, the ac-
count Jesus does gIve m the quoted passage from Mark-that 
the use of parable does and IS mtended to obfuscate, and to 
prevent rather than promote understanding-seems so alarm-
mg.57 It IS a natural questIOn to ask, then, whether Jesus' radi-
55. Perhaps the most exhaustive attempt to explrun, Justify, and partly criticIze 
narrative JurIsprudence along these lines IS Kathryn Abrruns, Heanng the Call of 
StOrieS, 79 CAL. L. REV. 971 (1992). 
56. Id. at 977-78. 
57. BALL, supra note 1, at 107-08 ("Jesus's saYIng lS deeply disturbmg"). 
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cally different explanatIOn for Ins use of parables, and the theo-
lOgIcal as well as epIstemologIcal debate between Ball and 
Kermode that that explanatIOn has trIggered, has anytInng to 
say to our contemporary debate about the use of narratIve and 
parable by critIcal race and femIrust legal scholars. 
First, Kermode's account of that passage-that it IS testImony 
to the opaqueness of narratIvity-does shed some light on the 
controverSIes surrounding the use of narratIve by CritICal race 
scholars, and it does so m a way that underscores the com-
plamts of theIr maInstream critIcs. Kermode's mterpretatIOn of 
Mark's account of Jesus' explanatIon of Ins use of parables, quite 
directly explaIns, as well as Justifies, the discomfiture of maIn-
stream scholars with the critIcal race scholars' use of narratIve. 
If Kermode IS nght, then the traditIonal legal scholars are sure-
ly also nght to tInnk of narratIve as m some wayan illegitImate 
form of discourse: narratIves SImply are opaque, Kermode ar-
gues; they truly cannot be translated mto a set of claIms. TheIr 
use will only obfuscate Issues rather than further understand-
mg. For all of those reasons, they should not be a part of legal 
argument, the goal of wInch must be, at least m part, to commu-
rucate, and to commurucate clearly 
The alternatIve explanatIOn for the use of narratIvity m CritI-
cal scholarsInp that Ball's mterpretatIOn of Mark's accountmg of 
Jesus' comments suggests IS that, at least some of the tIme, the 
use of narratIve by these scholars may promote and may be 
mtended to promote a transformatIOn m the listener not by 
broaderung understanding, but rather, m effect, by blockmg tra-
ditIonal understanding and forgIng m its place an "empty space." 
LIsten agaIn to Ball: "Mark encourages the reader to approach 
texts with expectant regard for what IS unSaId as well as what IS 
SaId-for theIr open-endedness, silences, negatIve spaces, mex-
plicable disturbances, and OmISSIOnS as well as for theIr plaIn 
statement. There the Word may be at work."s8 The same lesson, 
I suggest, may be well applied to at least some of the narratIves 
and parables put forward m scholarsInp by the outSIder legal 
scholars. Two examples illustrate tIns pomt. 
58. [d. at 129-30. 
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In The Alchemy of Race and Rights, PatncIa Williams tells a 
story about a black child mauled to death by two polar bears In 
a ZOO.59 Unlike many of the other stones In tms book, wmch I 
tmnk can be "translated" relatIvely easily Into straIghtforward 
arguments about the nature of raCIsm and poverty,60 tms par-
tIcular story, and her treatment of it, both reSIst and Invite 
InterpretatIOn In preCIsely the way Kermode suggests. One sure-
ly can (and many no doubt do, Including me) Interpret the story 
as beIng "about" the lethal effects of a pnmitIve, untmnkIng, 
and even oddly "innocent" but brutal form of white raCIsm on 
the AfrIcan Amencan community Other InterpretatIons, howev-
er, are "equally plausible," and it IS Indeed that "equal plausibil-
Ity" that makes it Impossible to reduce the story about the polar 
bears to any partIcular set of claIms about raCIsm-that IS the 
sense In wmch narrativity renders InterpretatIon Impossible. 
Williams' polar bears story, In other words, seems to be an ex-
ample of the opaqueness wmch Kermode finds In narratIve gen-
erally Because it Invites multIple InterpretatIOn, it defies au-
thoritatIve InterpretatIon. Its message IS always secret. 
But perhaps there IS another way that at least thl.s partl.Cular 
story operates on readers and listeners; another way it affects or 
fails to affect people; another way it ''works.'' A student In my 
law and literature class last semester told me In a fit of pIque 
that "I don't have any Idea what the polar bears are supposed to 
be. I hate thIS quaSI-poetIc stuff." Then she smiled and SaId, ''but 
it did make me stop." Two weeks later tms student who had 
claImed no Interest In race wrote and presented a fine paper 
about unconscIOUS raCIsm In vanous pIeces of literature. I don't 
tmnk it IS too much of a stretch to say that at least for tms 
student, the polar bears story created an "empty space" or an 
"irruptIOn" In her preconceIved Views of race and raCIal Injury In 
the sense Ball attributes (if I've got tms nght) to Mark's under-
standing of Jesus. 
59. PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS: THE DIARY OF A 
LAW PROFESSOR 207-08 (1991). 
60. I tned to do so m my reVIew of Williams' book. See Robm West, Murdenng 
the Sp~rit: Rac~sm, Rights and Commerce, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1771 (1992) (book re-
VIew). 
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My second example concerns a pIece by Mane Ashe entitled 
Zig-Zag St~tchmg,61 In whIch Ashe, among many other thIngs, 
narrates the pamful and dangerous CIrcumstances of the bIrths 
of her several children In graphIc detail. These stones, like the 
polar bears story, defy Interpretation. In fact, the effect these 
narratives had, at least on me, and I thInk on many other read-
ers, wasn't even In the mental realm. The effect was phYSICal. 
Ashe's descnptIOns of her expenences giVing bIrth made me sIck; 
I went home that day and crawled In bed and stayed there. 
Those stones made me stop. I was made aware quite literally of 
an "empty space," a space the borders of whIch are defined by 
the maternal expenence of bIrth and its attendant dangers, and 
a space that IS uncovered by legal scholarshIp and largely uncov-
ered by culture, and a space Into whIch I feared to tread. 
Critics of narrative and femImst JUTIsprudence have criticIzed 
Zig-Zag St~tchmg largely because it IS not clear how, if at all, 
Ashe's narratives contribute to the larger argument she IS mak-
Ing In the pIece, or even what the larger argument mIght be.62 
In one sense, the critiCIsm IS well taken, and even understated. 
Ashe's pIece ultimately argues for the deregulatIon of the proVi-
SIOn of reproductive health care,63 and if anythIng, the stones 
she tells seem to counsel toward the opposite conclusIOn. But In 
another sense, the critiCIsm IS wildly mIsplaced. The maJor effect 
of Ashe's narratives, I thInk, and perhaps IntentIOnally so, are 
Ballian rather than Kermodian. They cause an IrruptIOn In the 
complacent public and cultural wilful blindness to the meamng 
of the expenence of giVing bIrth. ThIs pIece, entitled Zig-Zag 
St~tchmg, tears at the seamless SOCIal cloth of silence that sur-
rounds the expenence and the danger of giVing bIrth. Whether it 
does so "successfully" or not has nothIng to do with how, and 
whether, it supports or detracts from arguments for deregulating 
health care. It has, rather, everythIng to do with what happens 
next, with what it prompts, or with what IS revealed In the emp-
ty space it creates. 
61. Mane Ashe, Zig-Zag Stitchmg and the Seamless Web: Thoughts on "Reproduc-
tion" and the Law, 13 NOVA L. REv. 355 (1989). 
62. See Sherry & Farber, supra note 53, at 847. 
63. Ashe, supra note 61, at 383. 
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At any rate, Ball's mterpretatIOn of Mark's account of Jesus' 
bewildenng comments about the opaqueness of narratIve IS 
Itself, to say the least, somewhat opaque. Ball hImself character-
Izes hIs mterpretatIon as tentatIve, as a work-m-progress.64 I'm 
not sure I understood what Ball was saYIng, and I'm sure I don't 
see what Jesus was saYIng. But thIs much IS clear: it did make 
me stop. 
III. THE PENULTIMATE "No" AND THE ULTIMATE ''YES'' 
The second maJor theme of Ball's meditatIOns IS presented m 
a far more accessible-because less mystenous and less techm-
cal-chapter than that discussed above, entitled Dilsey, Baby 
Suggs, and the Nonreligwus Word.65 In that chapter, Ball mtro-
duces first a critIque of religIosity, and then a partIal endorse-
ment: m hIs words, a penultImate "No" to religIOn, followed by 
an ultImate ''Yes.''66 Both the critIque and the endorsement 
play a maJor role m the book and are worth lookIng at m some 
detail of theIr own nght. I, however, ultImately will argue that 
whatever theIr theolOgIcal merits, Ball's arguments about reli-
gIon and God's Word are nchly suggestIve of a SImilar or analo-
gous relatIOnshIp we mIght be able to artIculate between law 
and JustIce. 
The critIque begIns with a firm distmctIOn between belief and 
religIOUS practIce, and between the Word of God and religIOUS 
teachIngs: 
The charactenstIc of religIOn that draws theolOgIcal critI-
CIsm IS less its weakness than its strength: its attempt to 
reach beyond the present world toward a god whom it postu-
lates and whose help and protectIon its adherents Invoke. 
ThIs attempt at self-transcendence IS worthy and noble. Its 
worthIness and nobility are no small part of the difficulty 
encountered In CritICIZIng it. 
The questIon IS whether, by InvitIng self-transcendence, 
religIOn IS not a mIsdirectIOn. In the biblical stones God gIves 
64. BALL, supra note I, at 106. 
65. [d. at 73-95. 
66. [d. at 82, 102. 
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hnnself and makes hnnself known. TIns self-revelatIOn does 
not correspond to religIOn, to human stnvrng toward God. 
The revealed Word does not fill m our vanous attempts to 
make our way to God. In the receIved language for talkmg. 
about these matters: Grace does not perfect nature, revela-
tIon does not complete reason, and mercy does not make up 
the deficit of good works. God makes rus own way to humans, 
and rus self-revelatIon bears its own possibilitIes for bemg 
known or not known. Jacob's ladder extended from heaven to 
earth, not the other way around. 
If we try to grasp at God, we do not believe. If we did be-
lieve we would listen, but m religIOn, as Barth noted, we talk; 
consequently, "because it IS a graspmg, religIOn IS the contra-
dictIon of revelatIon [and IS] the concentrated expreSSIOn of 
unbelief RevelatIon does not link up with a human reli-
gIon wruch IS already present and practIced. It contradicts 
it."67 
Ball's critIque of religIOn IS not the familiar complaInt that 
religIOn, much of the tIme, IS the handmaIden of exploitatIve 
power. TIns POInt Ball fully concedes. TIns IS, Ball explaInS, reli-
gIon at its worst.68 In other words, Ball's critIque of religIosity 
IS not a critIque of orgaruzed religIon at its worst. It IS a critIque 
of religIon, and of the religIOUS expenence, "at its best."69 The 
problem with religIon "at its best," Ball argues, IS that it holds 
out to the practitIoner the InvitatIOn to engage In forms of reli-
gIOUS devotIon wmch are at theIr root narclsslstIC.70 The quest 
for the expenence of personal transcendence, through the forms 
of religIon, or for a ''hndge to heaven" through acceptance of 
Jesus, to use the Sunday school formulatIOn of essentIally the 
same theolOgIcal positIOn,71 paradOXIcally but Inevitably weds 
the religIOUS devotee to a narCISSIstIc reflectIOn of self. Because 
of that narCISSIsm, the dance of deliverance and transcendence 
wmch religIon prOmIses IS, at root, a dance of death. It takes us 
67. [d. at 79-80 (footnotes omitted). 
68. [d. at 76-77. 
69. [d. at 77. 
70. [d. at 81. 
71. For a descnption of the "hndge to heaven," see zd. at 79-80. 
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away from life, away from the world, away from our socIal ties 
and away from our community, away from responsibility-In es-
sence, away from the realm In whIch we may genUInely live a 
life In response to God's Word. 
Ball turns to Faulkner's Lzght m August72 for an account of 
the harms done by "religion at its best"· 
Some expenence of these ["noXIOUS possibilitIes of religIon at 
its best"] IS available m Lzght m August. In that novel, an 
old, discredited, lost mInlster, the Reverend Gail Hightower, 
hears the sounds of approachIng Sunday everung servIce m 
the Presbytenan church that had been hIs parIsh years 
ago From hIs liVIng room WIndow, Hightower sees mem-
bers of the congregatIon exchange greetIngs as they approach 
from the streets. Then m hIs memory he hears theIr low-
toned talkIng as they enter the church for the Sunday eve-
rung prayer meetIng: "It has seemed to hIm always that at 
that hour man approaches nearest of all to God, nearer than 
at any other hour of all the seven days. Then alone, of all 
church gathenngs, IS there somethIng of that peace whIch IS 
the promIse and the end of the Church." There, m "the 
cool soft blOWIng of faith and hope," religIon achIeves its 
apex And yet. 
''Yet even then the mUSIC has still a quality stern 
and Implacable, deliberate and without paSSIOn so 
much as ImmOlatIOn, pleading, askmg, for not love, not 
life, forbIdding it to others, demanding m sonorous 
tones death as though death were the boon, like all 
Protestant mUSIC Pleasure, ecstasy, they cannot 
seem to bear: theIr escape from it IS m VIolence 
And so why should not thezr religwn drwe them to 
crucLfixwn of themselves and one another'l he thInks." 
On the follOWIng day, the town lynches Joe Chnstmas. 
At the very moment when theIr religIon carned those Pres-
bytenans as close to God as it could, at that same pomt of 
hIghest reach, it also drove its practitIoners away from God 
toward death ThIs IS religIon at its hIghest, not its low-
est. 
72. WILLIAM FAULKNER, LIGHT IN AUGUST (1932). 
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It was when Martm Luther King saw southern churches' 
"lofty sprres pomtmg heavenward" that he was dnven to 
ask, "What kmd of people worshIp here? Who IS theIr God?" 
The answer to hIs question IS: ordinary white Amencan reli-
gIOUS people at the moment of therr religIOUS best, reli-
gIous people may also be at therr most moribund.73 
The penultImate "No," though, IS followed by the ultImate 
(although qualified) ''Yes.'' ReligIOn can be a lived, communal, 
partIculanzed, response to the Word. It IS not mevitably the 
Faulknenan dance of death described above. ReligIOn, and the 
religIOUS expenence, can teach a despIsed people to love them-
selves. It can mfuse a feeling of purpose and solidarity and fel-
low feeling mto an otherwIse bleak eXIstence. It can redirect the 
attentIon of the believer toward the community of life withIn 
whIch one can live out a genUIne response to God's Word. When 
religIon serves these ends, Ball argues, religIon m effect has 
been "adopted" by the Word.74 Like secular mst~tutwns, religIon 
holds out possibilitIes; like secular mstitutIons, God mIght adopt 
religIon toward His own ends. When He does so, religIon be-
comes "for life" rather than a dance of death; it counsels and 
creates self love where such self love IS needed; it attends to the 
mdiVIdual and the community where such attentIOn IS otherwIse 
wantIng. 
Ball agam turns to literature (and agam to Faulkner!) to 
proVIde examples of religIon "adopted" by God's Word. The first 
of two examples he gIves comes from Faulkner's The Sound and 
the Fury 75 In the relevant passages from The Sound and the 
Fury, the central character Dilsey, a servant, takes from an 
Easter serVIce a feeling of renewal, after whIch everythIng IS the 
"same yet different." She becomes, from her engagement with 
thIs essentIally religIOUS expenence, powerful m her positIOn of 
weakness: 
Like other members of the congregatIon, she IS returned to 
the world. For her and her family, thIs means the Compson 
place 
73. BALL, supra note 1, at 77-78 (footnotes omitted). 
74. [d. at 82-95. 
75. WILLIAM FAULKNER, THE SOUND AND THE FURy (1946). 
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Dilsey had been unburdened, really unburdened, but m 
order to return to the burdemng world and not m order to 
escape from it 
Dilsey's post-Easter world· IS unalleVIated of ordinarmess, 
but that IS not to say it remams the same. Its ground has 
been fundamentally, radically reVIsed. 
The Compson place contInues along its customary traJecto-
ry But its foundatIons have been shaken. Dilsey's Infinite 
eXIstence mtersects her finite eXIstence, Judgmg the sound 
and fury of the Compson household. The mtersectIon IS both 
radical and unremarked ~ 
Her contInumg life m the Compson household may be read 
together with Jesus' paSSIve conservatIsm m the face of Ro-
man Impenalism and militarIsm Similarly, MartIn Lu-
ther King's non-VIolence and subsequent assassmatIon only 
hIghlight the fact that hIs dream of a raCIally reconciled 
South undercut the old raCIst premIses 
Ammated by Easter, Dilsey was no more acqUIescent than 
revolutIOnary, although she mIght appropnately have been 
either or both 
She IS ready for what lies ahead. Without romantICIsm or 
sentImentality, [s]he could bear the abuse and the bur-
dens of the Compsons, but her life was also a remonstrance 
agamst them. She was capable of rebukIng as well as of ac-
ceptIng, of war as well as of peace 
Dilsey recollects the Lamb m the mIdst of the kitchen. She 
smgs hymns there not as a religIOUS mterlude but m the 
mIdst of her life and m support of it. Unburdened, she be-
comes burdened agam: comfortIng the afflicted BenJamm, 
protectIng Dilsey, rebukIng Jason.76 
The second example comes from TOnI MaTTIson's Beloved.77 
Baby Suggs, the non-ordamed mInIster, teaches a people, 
through her preachIng, to ''love theIr flesh," and by so domg, 
76. BALL, supra note 1, at 87-90 (pages and footnotes omitted). 
77. TONI MORRISON, BELOVED (1987). 
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teaches a theretofore unloved and despIsed community to love 
themselves: 
In the summer, every afternoon, she led the community to a 
clearmg ill the woods where her heart "pumped out love" and 
her mouth "spoke the Word." She called the children to 
laugh, and the men to dance and the women to cry until the 
dancmg and laugbmg and crymg were all InlXed up and ex-
haustmg, and then: 
She did not tell them to clean up theIr lives or to go 
and sm no more. She did not tell them they were the 
blessed of the earth, its mheritmg meek or its 
glorybound pure. 
She told them that the only grace they could have 
was the grace they could IDlagme. That if they could 
not see it, they would not have it. 
"Here," she SaId, "in thIs here place, we flesh; flesh 
that weeps, laughs; flesh that dances on bare feet ill 
grass. Love it. Love it hard. Yonder they do not love 
your flesh. They despIse it. They don't love your eyes; 
they'd Just as soon pICk em out. No more do they love 
the skill on your back. Yonder they flay it You got 
to love it, you! More than eyes or feet. More than 
lungs that have yet to draw free aIr. More than your 
life-holding womb and your life-gIvrng prIvate parts, 
hear me now, love your heart. For thIs IS the prIze." 
Saymg no more, she stood up then and danced with her 
twIsted hIp the rest of what her heart had to say while 
the others opened theIr mouths and gave her the mu-
SIC.78 
Both Dilsey's and Baby Suggs' experIences are "religIOUS," but 
they are religIOUS experIences that return the believer to the 
community, and the lives, that can nurture life, and, therefore, 
return the believer to the Word of God. 
Ball's explanatIon of the way -In whIch religIon can sometImes 
"come alive" In the way described above IS that God's Word, on 
occaSIon "adopts" religIon.79 ReligIon can be, although it by no 
means Inevitably IS, the way by whIch God's Word IS revealed. 
78. BALL, supra note 1, at 91 (quoting MORRISON, supra note 77, at 88-89). 
79. [d. at 85-86. 
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But at tImes it IS, and when it IS, it IS because it has been 
"adopted" by God's Word toward precIsely that end: 
There IS nothIng here about human fulfillment, or human 
flourIshIng, or ethIcal values, or the power of positIve thmk-
mg, or what one must do to be saved, or the believrng self 
and its work of belief, or of applicatIons of biblical teachIngs 
to daily life. Instead, there IS the Word. And there IS belief, 
but belief happens, IS enacted, IS generated by the communal 
proclamatIon. 
In the religIon it thus adopts, the Word, although 
mcorrespondent, becomes nonetheless accessible-m words 
and m hearts speakIng beyond the need for words The 
mcorrespondent Word, the wholly other, IS contextually, par-
tIcularly human. 
ThIs IS critIcal. ReligIon adopted by the Word IS not about 
religIon or the self but about the world and humans, 
about the struggle "to make and to keep human life hu-
man m the world." 
Her religIon-religIon adopted by the Word-Is determma-
tlVe of who she IS as a human and of how she IS human. It 
cannot occupy an Isolated sphere either metaphYSIcal or pn-
vate. It gIves her humanity and life mstead of rescumg her 
from either.so 
Thus, the ultImate ''Yes'' follows the penultImate "No." 
Ball's account of religIosity IS relevant to contemporary legal 
practIce and scholarshIp m two ways. The first IS SImply meth-
odolOgIcal: Ball's dialectIcal method, whIch George Hunsmger 
calls the "Chalcedoman pattern,,81 and whIch conSIsts of the 
"penultImate no followed by the ultImate yes," finds a close par-
allel m the attitudinal stance of critIcal femImst and race schol-
ars, and perhaps of progreSSIve legal scholars generally, toward 
law There too, one finds a penultImate critIque of law and its 
legitImatmg functIOns, followed by an ultImate embrace.82 Con-
80. [d. (footnotes omitted). 
81. See zd. at 102; see also GEORGE HUNSINGER, How TO READ KARL BARTH: THE 
SHAPE OF HIS THEOLOGY 85 (1991). 
82. For a detailed diSCUSSIOn of thIS phenomenon, see Robm West, Constitutional 
Skepticzsm, 72 B.U. L. REV. 765 (1992). 
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sIder, for example, Cathanne MacKinnon's account of her own 
scholarshIp regarding the meamng of equality In constitutIonal 
and federal cIvil nghts law· "The first part of these reflectIons 
takes on the complacency of the VIew that women have nghts 
when we do not; the second part stands agaInst the luxunous 
cymcIsm that deSPaIrIngly assumes women have no nghts when 
we do, or could.,,83 Similarly, Man Matsuda argues explicitly 
that from the perspectIve of the "VOIces at the bottom," law IS 
penultImately an obstacle, but UltImately a potentIal ally for 
liberatIon and equality 84 
How to explaIn thIs ambIvalence? It IS possible, of course, to 
VIew thIs critIcal ambIvalence as beIng SImply strategIc: where 
law helps, then embrace it, where law hurts, reSIst it. But 
"strategy" IS not a very satIsfyIng account for the actual expen-
ence of the ambIvalence described, and felt, above. PartIcularly 
the ultImate embrace, but also I thInk the penultImate critIque 
as well, feels more authentIc than Instrumental-more substan-
tIve and In a sense more "total," than strategIc. I have always 
felt myself at a loss when tryIng to describe thIs phenomenon. 
Ball's descnptIon of the relatIon between religIon and God's 
Word, and partIcularly of the way In whIch religIon IS from tIme 
to tIme "adopted" by the Word, or "intersects" with the Word, 
suggests what mIght be a more satIsfyIng account than the stra-
tegIc one given above, although it IS by necessity a metaphoncal 
one. 
The account IS SImply thIs: Law stands to JustIce preCIsely as 
Ball argues that "religIon" stands to God's Word. Law cannot 
serve as a bndge to JustIce, any more than religIon can serve as 
a bndge to God's Word. We cannot "reach" JustIce by stnVIng to 
make our law evermore pure. JustIce IS not an abstract state to 
be achIeved through an InSIstence on the Integrity, wholeness, 
purity, or conSIstency of laws. To thInk of law In thIs way-as 
the bndge, so to speak, to JustIce, if only we can get it nght-Is 
a "mISdirectIOn." It mISCOnCeIves the nature of JustIce. JustIce, 
83. Catharme A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE 
L.J. 1281, 1324 (1991). 
84. See Marl Matsuda, Lookmg to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Repara-
tions, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 323, 324 (1987). 
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like God's Word, must "direct" its seeker to the realm of life, 
commumty and relatIons among people. The Just socIety IS not a 
metaphysIcal state of bemg to be achIeved through some sort of 
purifyIng legalistIc process, Just as an mdiVIdual understanding 
of the nature of JustIce IS not somethIng to be achIeved through 
an abstracted mtellectual pursuit. But nor IS it the case that law 
IS Irrelevant to JustIce. Rather, as religIOn IS sometImes adopted 
by God's Word, or mtersects with it, law can sometImes be 
"adopted" by JustIce. When it IS, JustIce Inheres m law, and when 
It IS, JustIce IS found, not m the law itself, but m the relatIons 
between Just people serving commumtIes, and domg so with the 
mechamsms and substance of a Just law 
Let me try to spell thIs out m a little more detail. Recall the 
first step of Ball's argument: religion at its worst IS m the ser-
Vice of power, with familiar attendant evils. But religion at its 
best IS also problematIc. The problem with religion at its best, IS 
that by puttmg itself forward as a brIdge to God, it turns the 
believer's quest for transcendence narCIssIstIcally mward. "Reli-
gion IS finally centered on the self. The Word directs to the oth-
er.,,85 But religion can, from tIme to tIme be "adopted" by God's 
Word, and when it IS, It returns the believer toward the work of 
engagement with communitIes of life. 
Now, of course, law at ~ts worst can be, and should be, critI-
cIzed. And it IS. Constantly Law at its worst legitImates, m the 
sense meant by the crItIcal legal scholars, the commands, 
whIms, will, and mterests, of the politIcally dOmInant sectors of 
a legal community There IS also, however, a moral problem with 
law at ~ts best, and it IS the far more subtle problem suggested 
by Ball's crItICal account of religiOSIty-the penultImate "No." 
Thmk for a moment of Ronald Dworkin's mspired liberal legal 
accounts of law as bemg constantly defined and redefined by its 
''best'' aspiratIOns.86 Dworkin's account may be the ''best'' ac-
count of law "at ItS best." According to Dworkin, the very defim-
tIon of law, and certaInly its substance, ought to be understood 
by reference to ItS Idealized content. Law "at its best," Dworkin 
85. BALL, supra note I, at 98. 
86. RoNALD DWORKIN, A MATI'ER OF PRINCIPLE (1985); RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING 
RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977) [heremafter TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY]. 
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argues, when properly understood, 1,S the bndge by whIch we 
reach an understanding of the content of politIcal JustIce,87 Just 
as, In a strikIngly analogous way, religIOn "at its best," according 
to Ball, presents itself as a bndge to the Word of God, and ac-
ceptance by Him. But In the case of law, Just as In the case of 
religIOn, by vzrtue of that fact, law "at its best" In effect keeps us 
away from the realm In whIch JustIce may be found and crafted, 
Just as, analogously, religIOn, by VIrtue of its self-presentatIOn as 
a bndge to God, keeps -the devotee away from the human realm 
In whIch God's Word may be revealed. Because law at its best 
presents itself as the bndge to JustIce, it keeps the legal practI-
tIoner, scholar, or Judge out of the realm of community and life, 
the realm In -whIch JustIce may In fact be realized through the 
medium of Just people dOIng what JustIce reqUIres for the com-
munitIes In whIch they labor, and turned Instead toward the 
realm of the actual and Ideal law on the books, constantly bet-
tenng itself through InterpretatIon, modificatIOn, amendment 
and change. It keeps the legal practitIOner or scholar Immersed 
In the group narratIve proJect of perfectIng, through telling, 
retelling, and reInterpretmg, the story of law It prOmIses JustIce 
as the end result oftms obsessIOn with the perfectIon oflaw, but 
its prOmIse IS and must be illusory Law at its best keeps the 
legal believer In the ultImately narCIssIstIc CIrcle of legallIDagm-
Ings. The penultImate ''NO.''88 
But, at least on occaSIOn, tms very JlinsprudentIal pro-
Ject-the liberal legal proJect so well described by DworkIn, of 
the law, through the work of Judges, lawyers and scholars, con-
stantly seekIng to render itself more Just-can be put to the 
serVIce of JustIce, by persons workmg In the community toward 
the end of a Just world. When it IS, I tmnk it makes sense to say 
that law has been "adopted" by JustIce. When we use law In such 
CIrcumstances, we use it not Just "strategIcally," but we align 
ourselves with it; it becomes a moral undertakIng. We become 
87. DworkIn has made thIS argument m a vanety of ways m many different writ-
mgs, but perhaps rus clearest statement appears m rus essay How Law Is Like 
Literature, m A MA'ITER OF PRINCIPLE 146, 160-64 (1985). 
88. Robert Cover of Yale makes a sImilar critique m Violence of the Word, 95 
YALE L.J. 1601 (1986) (discussmg the mterplay between legal mterpretation and 
VIolence). 
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comnntted to it through and through, and Justifiably so. The 
ultImate ''Yes.'' Let me present two examples of what I now 
thInk of as ''law adopted by JustIce." One comes, agaIn, from a 
student, and one from the work of a scholar. 
A student approached me thIs semester wantIng to discuss a 
possible law review note m whIch she wanted to attack, under 
the First Amendment, the constItutIOnality of ordinances whIch 
forbId protestors from disruptIng sport huntmg, by demonstrat-
mg agaInst the practIce m woods and forests where huntIng IS 
allowed. The problem wIth her argument, as she conceded, IS 
that the conduct prohibited by the ordinances IS clearly more 
than Just speech. The ordinance IS aImed at prohibitIng the dis-
ruptIon of the hunt, and the protestors are most assuredly aIm-
mg not Just to VOIce theIr VIews but to disrupt that lawful behav-
IOr. 
My student, like the protestors she wants to help, IS an ethI-
cal vegetanan deeply concerned about our reckless cruelty to 
ammals, and partIcularly about theIr casual slaughter and con-
sumptIon for pleasure. She wants very much to find a way to 
use the First Amendment to further the protestors' cause and 
the ammals' well-bemg. The problem, of course, IS that it IS not 
at all clear she can do so, gIven the protestors' avowed mtentIon 
to disrupt lawful behaVIor and not merely express lawful dis-
sent. She feels herself stuck on the horns of a dilemma. She can 
mIsstate the protestors' goals, by limItIng theIr acts to "speech," 
and then make a conventIOnal and possibly successful First 
Amendment argument. AlternatIvely, she could state theIr goals 
correctly, m whIch case, gIven her understanding of the law, at 
best she could use theIr plight as a spnngboard for critIcIzmg 
the unduly cramped and limited reach of the First Amendment. 
What she could not figure out a way to do, of course, IS what she 
wanted to do, and that was to use law as a bndge to achIeve 
what she strongly saw to be the Just conclUSIOn: protectIng the 
protest itself, even aSSUmIng that ItS mtent as well as effect 
would be to disrupt the lawful practIce of huntIng for sport. 
I suggested to thIs student that she read, m additIon to the 
relevant First Amendment law, Ronald DworkIn's early essays 
m Takmg R~ghts Serwusly, and partIcularly the chapters m that 
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work devoted to diScussIons of cIvil disobedience.89 She did so, 
and has SInce returned to her project with a renewed sense of 
purpose. I suggest that her use of DworkIn's JUrIsprudentIal 
project lnlght be understood, loosely, as analogous to the "ul-
tImate Yes" that Ball eventually bestows upon some religIous 
practIces. Put differently, In the hands of a practitIoner con-
cerned to brIng JustIce to and In the world, the JUrIsprudentIal 
liberal legal project so well described by DworkIn lnlght be 
"adopted" by JustIce. The "lnlsdirectIon" noted In DworkIn's pro-
Ject, or the "penultImate no" bestowed upon it, lnlght become 
from tIme to tIme the "ultImate yes." 
DworkIn argued, it may be recalled, In hIs early work that the 
ConstitutIon does and should protect (despite Supreme Court 
authority to the contrary) the acts of draft protestors even 
though theIr protests Involved illegal acts, because of the ult~­
mate illegality and unconstitutIonality of the war itself, even 
though the war had not been authoritatIvely found unconstitu-
tIonal. 90 The ConstitutIon, understood "in its best light," 
DworkIn argued, condemns the war as an unconstitutIonal use 
of governmental force. Accordingly, the ConstitutIon should 
protect the "protestors" of that illegal and unconstitutIonal gov-
ernmental act agaInst arrest for theIr concededly illegal actIVI-
tIes.91 Our commitment to VIgorous protest and dissent, the 
spIrit of whIch IS captured In our First Amendment, should be 
deep enough to protect the actIvitIes of protest, and the partICI-
pants agaInst arrest, when the constitutIonal claIm they are 
makIng IS a colorable one. 
That argument IS a quite stunmng example of law "adopted 
by" JustIce. Law, partIcularly constitutIonal law, was beIng read 
"in its best light" not so as to create an abstract bndge toward a 
rarified understanding of the reqUIrements of politIcal JustIce, 
but rather, so as to be pressed toward a Just result In a partIcu-
lar community at a partIcular tIme-the protectIon of the orga-
mzed protest of the Vietnam War. The Idealized account of law 
89. See RONALD DWORKIN, Civil Disobedience, m TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra 
note 86, at 206-22 (1977). 
90. [d. at 220-22. 
91. [d. at 214-15, 221. 
HeinOnline -- 35 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1130 1993-1994
1130 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:1101 
presented m Dworkm's early work, unlike lns later work, was 
presented as a way by wlnch JustIce could be done m commum-
ty-not as a way that the meamng of JustIce could be grasped m 
mtellectual or JudicIal cIrcles. 
To return to my student's problem: it IS certaInly possible to 
see the acts of the ammal nghts actIVIsts m tlns situatIOn as m 
oppositIOn to, and mdeed lnghlightmg the shortsIghtedness of, 
our constitutIOnal scheme of libertIes. The First Amendment 
does not protect tlns actIvity, albeit perhaps it should, and hence 
the actIVIty exposes the madequacIes of the First Amendment. 
But it IS also possible to argue that although current under-
standing does not reflect it, the First Amendment does and 
should protect tlns actIvity To put the pomt mImmally, surely it 
IS possible, or at least my student IS now attemptIng to argue 
that it IS possible, to VIew state protectIOn of the actIvity target-
ed by these protestors-huntmg for sport-as an unconstitutIOn-
al attack on ammals, even though current understanding IS 
umformly to the contrary Surely it IS also possible to argue, by 
analogy to Dworkm's argument regarding the draft resIsters, 
that our commitment to dissent and protest, mstitutIonalized 
through the First Amendment, IS deep enough to protect that 
actIvity accordingly Like Dworkm's argument for the draft re-
sIsters, the argument my student wants to make for the hunt 
protestors (and through them, of course, for the ammals) re-
qUIres an Idealized constitutIOn-It IS only the ConstitutIon 
when read "in its best light," and most emphatIcally not the 
ConstitutIOn when read by the current Supreme Court or mdeed 
by any lnstoncal Court-that condemns state protectIOn of hunt-
mg for sport as an unconstItutIonal mfnngement of the nghts of 
ammals. But also like DworkIn's ongInal argument, the Ideal-
Ized constItutIOn It artIculates IS m the serVIce not of an abstract 
account of the nature of JustIce, but .rather, a concrete result 
sought on behalf of members of an eXIstmg community For that 
very reason, like DworkIn's actual argument on behalf of draft 
resIsters, tlns student's constItutIOnal claIm on behalf of hunt 
protestors IS an mstance, I would argue, usmg Ball's language, 
of "law adopted by JustIce." Neither argument seeks to "perfect 
the constitutIOnal narratIve" as a means of aclneVIng an abstract 
JustIce. Both seek to understand law "at ItS best" not as a bndge 
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by whIch the Ideal law that IS the ultImate outcome of the con-
stitutIOnal narratIve mIght be revealed; but rather, as a means 
of "doIng JustIce" In the community, as a means of achIevIng a 
Just result between members of that community 
ThIs (modified) Ballian metaphor of ''law adopted by JustIce" 
captures two strands of our way of thInkIng about JustIce that 
more conventIonal accounts do not capture well. First, it cap-
tures the sense (and it IS only a sense) In whIch JustIce IS "prIor" 
to law, In a way that IS analogous to Ball's InSIstence on the 
"PrIority" of God, or the diVIne, to the human. JustIce sImply "lS, 
and when it IS, it IS m and of the world-it Inheres In human 
relatIons, and In human communitIes. It IS not an Ideal abstrac-
tIon that legal doctrIne progressIvely apprOXImates by "workIng 
itself pure." To seek JustIce through the study or purificatIon of 
law IS, to use Ball's word, a mISdirectIOn.92 Rather, JustIce IS In 
the world, and it may on occaSIOn Intersect with law, and when 
it does so, law IS a vehIcle for its realizatIon. 
Second, the modified Ballian metaphor captures somethIng 
about the ambIvalence toward legal InstitutIons so central to 
progressIve lawyerIng, whIch more strategIc or Instrumental 
accounts of that ambIvalence leave out, and that IS, In a sense, 
the sp"lnt of the commitment to law that a seeker of JustIce may 
feel, when law has Indeed been "adopted" by JustIce. When we 
argue, for example, that a certaIn state of affaIrs IS unconstI-
tutIonal, it feels like we are saYIng more than that a certaIn 
state of affaIrs IS VIolatIve of a legal document that IS itself 
hOrrIfically unJust but that from tIme to tIme mIght be used 
Instrumentally to achIeve some gaIn In JustIce for subordinated 
peoples. It feels, rather, like we are alignmg the constitutIonal 
claIm with the moral claIm from JustIce, and there IS no ObVIOUS 
way the strategIc account of the relatIon between law and JustIce 
can fully capture that feeling of alignment. The Ballian "adop-
tIon" metaphor, though, does capture that feeling, and rather 
nIcely Law IS not SImply beIng "used" as a way to "get at" JUS-
tIce; rather, from tIme to tIme, law IS adopted by JustIce, law 
"intersects" with JustIce. At those POInts of IntersectIon, it IS 
fully approprIate-it IS certaInly not a manifestatIon of legalistIc 
92. BALL, supra note 1, at 73-95 & passlm. 
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false conSCIOusness-to align one's moral and legalist commit-
ments, and conVlctIOns. At those pomts, law manifests JustIce. 
One can, I trunk, find examples of law "adopted by JustIce" not 
only m occasIOnal moments of legal practIce narrowly under-
stood, but m legal scholarsrup as well. One notable example IS 
the constItutIOnal scholarsrup of Akhll Amar.93 Amar's recon-
structIve work on the Tlnrteenth and Fourteenth Amendments 
seeks an engagement with law m the serVIce of JustIce that IS 
more than Just strategIc and that IS more than academIc. The 
sense of JustIce that anImates rus rustorIcal reconstructIon of the 
Civil War Amendments IS one that pushes rum to find In the 
rustorIcal record eVldence of the unfulfilled prOmIse of those 
amendments to create a Just, as well as beloved, community 
The relatIOn between law and JustIce realized m Amar's rustOrI-
cal JUrIsprudence on the ReconstructIOn Amendments IS not that 
of a practIce strIVlng toward an Ideal. Law IS not understood m 
that work as a practIce constantly mOVlng toward an Ideal of 
JustIce, m turn mformed by the demands of consIstency, mternal 
coherence or mtegrity Indeed, JustIce IS not "infOrmIng" the 
directIOn law should take at all; it IS not a Vlrtue toward wruch 
law strIves. Rather, what seems to lie berund Amar's rustOrIcal 
constItutIonalism IS the sense that JustIce IS ever present and 
mayor may not ammate law, or a law, from the start. JustIce IS 
realized m the relatIOns between people and, from tIme to tIme, 
realized through the adopted mechamsms of law The Recon-
structIon Amendments, Amar mIght be understood as arguIng, 
themselves are an example of a law "adopted by JustIce." His 
own work uneartrung the OrIgInal understanding of the Recon-
structIon Amendments, it seems to me, IS another. 
Nor, though, IS the sense of JustIce m Amar's scholarsrup, and 
the relatIOnshIp between JustIce and law it seems to suggest, the 
relatIon of ambIvalent strategIsm suggested above; the pomt 
does not seem to be that with enough of the nght kmd of clever 
93. See Akhil R. Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 
YALE L.J. 1193 (1992); Akhil R. Amar, The Case of the Milling Amendments: R.AV 
v. City of St. Paul, 106 HARV. L. REV. 124 (1992); Akhil R. Amar & Damel 
Widawsky, Child Abuse as Slavery: A Thzrteenth Amendment Response to DeShaney, 
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scholarshIp, one can present an Infinitely malleable hIstoncal 
text In such a way as to make it appear as though the hIstoncal 
record can serve a present progressIve politIcal agenda. Rather, 
the clmm IS, Instead, that the law In thIs case zs Just-not that it 
can be "made" Just, or convIncIngly argued to serve JustIce, but 
that it IS Just, and was Just In its InceptIon. ThIs law, these 
Amendments, were adopted by JustIce. The commitment to JUS-
tIce, and the commitment to law, In thIs case, at thIs hIstoncal 
moment, with respect to thIs pIece of hIstory, are one and the 
same. 
IV CONCLUSION 
To return to Ball's work, the seven legal practIces Ball de-
scribes mIght themselves be consIdered examples of the adoptIOn 
of law by JustIce. It IS hIghly sIgnificant, I thInk, although I'm 
not sure precIsely what IS sIgnified, that nowhere does Ball hIm-
self describe them In that way AgaIn, Ball presents these prac-
tIces as examples oflives In law that are responSIve to the Word 
of God. It IS InterestIng to speculate as to why it IS that a book 
called The Word and The Law has so little, really nothIng, to say 
about JustIce. One reasonably mIght read quite a bit Into that 
pregnant negatIve. But whatever the author's own VIews, surely 
it IS not too much of a stretch to see these practIces as exempla-
ry not Just of a partIcular and praIseworthy relatIOn with God's 
Word, but also exemplary of a relatIOn with a quite different 
VIrtue. 
These practIces are all, one mIght argue, USIng Ball's vocabu-
lary In a way umntended by hIm but hopefully not out of line 
with hIs overall aIms, examples-of legal practIces that have been 
"adopted by JustIce." They all, no doubt, use law to achIeve JUS-
tIce. But agaIn, the relatIon revealed In these practIces between 
law and JustIce IS more than strategIc. Law "comes alive" for 
these practitIOners and theIr clients precIsely because the law 
has been used not merely for JustIce, but by JustIce-it IS JustIce 
that has effectuated the adoptIon. The practitIOners themselves 
have Indeed been "taken up" by somethIng larger than them-
selves. AgaIn, Ball Identifies that whIch has "taken them up" as 
"God's Word." It would not be InCOnSIstent, though, with hIs de-
scnptIon of either those practIces or of theIr moral tenor to Iden-
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tIfy the VIrtue withm whIch they practice as Justice. I would say, 
then, sImply, that these are ''legal practices" whIch have been 
adopted by Justice. What these practices, so understood, ulti-
mately reveal IS the possibility of a legal practice that IS not Just 
aImed "toward the end" of Justice, but one that, because it IS a 
practice of law, also and for that reason IS a practice of Justice as 
well. 
